A Novel SD–GMCR Framework Integrating System Dynamics and Conflict Resolution: A Case Study of the Mashhad Basin

Articles in Press

Document Type : Research Article

Authors

Reza Akhlaghi Moghadam ¹

Nasim Nahavandi ²

¹ Tarbiat Modares University

² Industrial & Systems Engineering Faculty, Tarbiat Modares University.

10.22067/jstinp.2026.96752.1192

Abstract

This study develops an integrated System Dynamics (SD)–Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) framework to explain persistent overdraft in the Mashhad Basin and to test policy mixes that decision makers are actually willing to sustain. GMCR identifies feasible equilibrium states by filtering out infeasible and reversible actions, feeding only stable states to SD, while SD provides hydrologic and behavioral feedback to refine the conflict analysis. Using 1999–2019 data, the model reproduces a long-run groundwater deficit of about 97 million cubic meters per year and evaluates the Gulf of Oman transfer as a mega project at national scale. Results show that penalty-based control of farmers reduces farm profitability and accelerates conversion of farmland to non-permanent residences that use much more water per hectare; villa users already account for a large share of demand and pay the highest unit costs. Economic signals are misaligned: agriculture yields roughly 0.30 USD/m³, industry above 47 USD/m³, while desalination and transfer cost about 0.76 USD/m³ for drinking and 4 USD/m³ for industry. Under a climate stress scenario (10% less precipitation, 10% more evapotranspiration), storage declines by about 1 billion cubic meters by 2040. The revised game stabilizes on added supply plus sustained consumption control without a tariff increase, while transfer alone is insufficient. Effective governance requires capped and transparent water rights, targeted demand management for non-permanent residences, and pricing reforms tied to economic value.

Keywords

System Dynamics

Game Theory

GMCR

Mashhad Basin

Water Resources Management

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